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Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know
N. Gregory Smith
Associate Professor
LSU Law Center
I. Introduction

In recent years, there have been frequent and substantial changes in the
laws and rules that govern the legal profession. Most of the changes have
occurred at the state level, but the practice of law can also be, and often is,
significantly affected by new rules or decisions of federal courts, and it is
sometimes affected by acts of the United States Congress. Moreover,
decisions of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility can influence how state disciplinary authorities apply the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, a program on legal ethics
should deal with more than state-level developments. At the same time, it
should be acknowledged that, every year, there are more professional
A.
responsibility developments than can reasonably be catalogued in written
materials for an hour-long CLE presentation on the subject. As a result,
only selected developments are referenced here.
II. In the News

California and Mandatory CLE
Not all lawyers are pleased to be subject to mandatory CLE
requirements. A California lawyer recently expressed his displeasure
the courts.
Warden, a 73 year old California lawyer, was placed on inactive status
for failure to comply with mandatory CLE requirements. He sued the State
Bar, claiming that the California CLE scheme was unconstitutional. More
particularly, Warden claimed that exemptions from the CLE requirements
for state officials, retired judges, and law professors lacked any rational
basis and that the scheme therefore violated equal protection. A California
appellate court agreed, and ordered reinstatement of Warden's right to
practice law.
The court said:
In sum, we hold the CLE program is unconstitutional. It violates equal
protection by forcing some attorneys licensed by the Bar who represent
individual clients in private practice, and not others, to comply with
the program for reasons having no rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest.
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49-50.
Warden may not be successful in the end. The California Supreme
Court has granted the State Bar's petition for review, superseding the
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decision ofthe appellate court. Warden v. State BarofCalifornia,62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 938 P.2d 371 (Cal. 1997)
B. Crash Victim Solicitation
In October 1996, federal legislation was adopted that prohibits lawyers
from soliciting victims of aircraft accidents, or their families, until 30 days
after the accident. The anti-solicitation provision was added to the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act. The new provision states:
In the event of an accident involving an air carrier providing interstate
or foreign air transportation, no unsolicited communication concerning a
potential action for personal injury or wrongful death may be made by an
attorney or any potential party to the litigation to an individual injured in
the accident, or to a1relative of an individual involved in the accident, before
the 30th day following the date of the accident.
49 U.S.C. § 136(g)(2).
The legislation also provides for a monetary penalty for violation of
the no-solicitation rule. See 49 U.S.C. § 1155(a).
Of course, lawyers have long been prohibited, by state ethics rules,
from making direct solicitations to non-clients. Rule 7.2(a) of the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct says that
[a] lawyer shall not solicit professional employment in person, by
person to person verbal telephone contact or through others acting at
his request or on his behalf from a prospective client with whom the
lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain.
In March of 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court amended Rule 7.2 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct to prohibit Louisiana lawyers from
sending targeted written solicitations to accident victims within 30 days of
the accident. See Rule 7.2(b), Rules of Professional Conduct. In short, the
Louisiana rules already prohibit much of the conduct covered by the new
federal legislation.
C. Malpractice
The ABA Journal provided some interesting "estimates" on the subject
of legal malpractice. Estimated annual amount of U.S. compensatory
awards for legal malpractice: $5.8 billion. Estimated annual amount of
punitive damages for legal malpractice: $580 million. Estimated percentage
of lawyers who do not carry malpractice insurance: 40 percent. Percentage
chance in a given year that a lawyer in private practice will face a legal
malpractice claim: 20 percent.
FigurativelySpeaking, ABA Journal, Oct. 1996, at 12.
A recent report by the ABA shows that "[b]y far" the types of activities
that draw the most claims of malpractice are "commencement of

-

266

-

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol45/iss1/16

2

Smith: Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know

action/proceeding" and "preparation, filing, transmittal of documents."
These activities together make up about 45 percent of all claims.
ABA Report Examines New Data on Legal Malpractice Claims, 13

ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 110 (April 30,
1997).
D. Communications with Represented Persons
Model Rule 4.2 ofthe Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
Where adopted, this rule has often been interpreted to prevent contacts
with employees of represented organizations. Federal prosecutors, in
particular, are unhappy with state ethics rules that forbid them from
contacting employees of organizations that are represented by attorneys.
Attorney General Janet Reno has issued a regulation that purports to exempt
lawyers of the federal government from such state rules. Recently, a
decision of the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
the Justice Department's regulation. See U.S. ex rel.O'Keefe v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1998). The court said that the

attorney general had no authority to issue such a regulation.
Coincidentally, the Conference of Chief Justices is giving some
thought to a proposed change to Model Rule 4.2. In its current draft form,
the new rule would widen the scope ofpermissible contacts by government
lawyers. Among other things, the proposed rule would bar government
lawyers from communicating only with members of a represented
organization's "control group." See News, 14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual
on Professional Conduct 20 (Feb. 2. 1998); Legal News, US Law Week,
January 20, 1998 (vol 66, no 27, page 2421).
E. Restatement
The ALI's work continues on its draft Restatement of the Law
GoverningLawyers. The ALI has now tentatively approved five the planned
nine restatement chapters. Charles Wolfram, the chief reporter for the
project, predicts that the restatement will be completed in 1999.
Proposed sections on lawyer civil liability prompted the most debate at
last years' ALI meeting. One of the provisions that received a lot of

attention was one that would have imposed tort liability on lawyers for an
intentional breach of any fiduciary duty set forth in any other part of the
restatement, at least when such breach causes damages. So, for example, a
lawyer would be liable, under the proposed rule, for an intentional violation
ofthe obligation to maintain client confidences or of the obligation to avoid
conflicts of interest when the client is damaged by the violation.
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The principal debate was over the appearance of the word
"intentional." Why, it was argued, should a lawyer only be liable for an
intentional breach ofa fiduciary duty? After considerable discussion, and
on a very close vote, the word "intentional" was dropped. So, under the
new tentative rule, a lawyer could be liable to a client in tort for any breach
of a fiduciary duty. However, at the moment there is other language in the
restatement indicating that liability will be appropriate only to the extent
provided by law governing breach of fiduciary duty.
See Restatement on Lawyers, 65 U.S.L.W. 2781 (1997).

It is not clear how all of this is going to come out. Of course, even
when the restatement is completed, it will not be binding authority. But it
may have considerable persuasive influence on questions like lawyer
liability. So there is something at stake in the ALI's debates.
F. Ethics 2000
Perhaps not to be outdone by the ALI, the ABA itself has launched a
comprehensive study ofthe rules of lawyer conduct. The initiative, called
Ethics 2000, is supposed to result in the creation of a special committee to
a
assess the ethics rules before the turn of the century.
It has been only 15 years since the ABA generated its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which form the basis of the professional
responsibility rules in Louisiana and most other states. The new initiative
could, of course, result in the promulgation of some new rules, or even
new code ofrules.
ABA Starts "Ethics 2000" Project ForSweeping Review of Rules,

a

ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, May 28, 1997.
G. Zero Fees
A recent unreported decision from Colorado shows what can happen
when a lawyer charges an unreasonable fee. (Eich v. GregoryA. Maceau
in News,
P.C., Colo. Ct. App., No. 96CA1354, 11/28/97, referred to14
ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 20 (Feb. 4, 1998).
Irene Eich was injured in an automobile accident
a by an uninsured,
represent her on
was
hired
to
Maceau
driver.
Attorney
intoxicated,
standard one-third contingency fee contract. Maceau made a $100,000
demand on Eich's insurer, because Eich carried $100,000 of uninsured
coverage. Eich had already incurred over $70,000 in medical expenses. The
insurer quickly paid the full amount ofcoverage. Maceau took $33,333.33
as fee.
Eich subsequently discharged Maceau, and sued him, claiming that his
fee was unreasonable. The jury found that Maceau did not prove the
reasonableness of his fee, and determined that the value of his services was
zero. The court cited Rule 1.5 for the proposition that contingent fee
arrangements, like other fee arrangements, must be reasonable, and
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ordered Maceau to refund the entire fee.
Maceau claimed that he had worked over 44 hours on the case, but the
court accepted the jury's conclusion that there was no value to the services
that he had provided. Commenting on this result, Lester Brickman, an
advocate for contingent fee reform said: "Contingent fee cases of this sort
are a form of theft." News, 14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct 21 (Feb. 4, 1998).
H. Bias and Prejudice
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility has proposed a revision to Model Rule 8.4(d) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. The current rule prohibits lawyers from
engaging in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice." The
committee would like the Comment that accompanies the rule to include the
following paragraph:
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly
manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy
respecting the forgoing factors does not violate paragraph (d).
Earlier proposals of a similar nature have proven to be controversial
and have not been adopted. Illinois law professor Ronald Rotunda discerns
First Amendment problems with the new proposal, because it applies to
words as well as conduct.
Legal News, 66 U.S. Law Week 2342, 2343 (Dec. 9,1997)

III. Selected Opinions from Outside Louisiana
A. Contempt of Court
Black v. Blount
938 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1996)
Blount, a Tennessee lawyer, got into trouble after ajury verdict did not
go his way. He represented the plaintiff in a personal injury action. The
jury returned a verdict of $35,000 in favor of his client. After the verdict
was read, Blount directed a "thumbs down" gesture to the jury, and
muttered that the verdict was "unjust." Before the conclusion of the
proceedings, Blount abruptly exited the courtroom, waving his hands in the
air, and complaining about a travesty of justice. Later, in the hallway
outside the courtroom, Blount approached some of the jurors and angrily
said he hoped that they "could live with themselves." 938 S.W.2d at 396.
He also pushed and jabbed his opponent, telling him that "You're the most
unethical attorney Iknow, you defrauded the Court and jury throughout this
entire trial, and you lied to the Court and jury." Id.
Blount was charged with and convicted of two counts of criminal
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contempt of court.
B. Working Too Hard
In re Fordham
668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996) cert. denied, 117. S.Ct. 1082 (U.S. 1997)
Fordham, a Massachusetts attorney, was publicly censured for
overbilling a 21 year old client who was charged with operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Fordham's client

was taken into custody after failing a field sobriety test. The police found a
partially full quart bottle ofvodka in his car. Subsequent breathalyzer tests
for the client registered .10 and .12 respectively.
Fordham billed by the hour. His bills showed 227 hours oftime spent
on the defense. The total billed for the defense, which was successful, was
$50,022.25. Even though it was conceded that the attorney acted diligently
and in good faith, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the
hours billed were excessive. The court said that the usual fee for this type
of case was less than 1/3 of the amount billed.
The court thought that many of the hours spent on the case were
attributable to the lawyer's inexperience with criminal matters in general
and with intoxication cases in particular. It said:
Fordham's inexperience in criminal defense work and OUI cases in

particular cannot justify the extraordinarily high fee. It cannot be that
an inexperienced lawyer is entitled to charge three or four times as
much as an experienced-lawyer for the same service. A client "should
not be expected to pay for the education of a lawyer when he spends
excessive amounts of time on tasks which, with reasonable experience,
become matters of routine."
668 N.E.2d at 822-823 (quoting In re Larsen, 694 P.2d 1051 (Wash.
1985).
C. Bad Bills
In re Berg

3 Cal. Stat Bar Ct. Rptr., 1997 WL 469003 (Cal. Bar Ct. 1997)
Berg, a California lawyer, engaged in fraudulent billing practices. He
had been retained to represent dentists in 41 malpractice actions. The
dentists were covered by insurance by The Dentists Insurance Company,
which agreed to pay $150 an hour for the representation. Between March
and December 1997, the insurance company paid Berg in excess of

$357,000. Most charges were billed at $150 an hour, but some were billed,
without notice, at $175 an hour.
Berg regularly billed the insurance company for work before it was
actually performed, but the billing statements nonetheless showed a date
the services were purportedly rendered, a description ofthose services, and
the time that was allegedly spent in performing the work. The lawyer's
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billing statements frequently indicated that he had worked more than 24
hours a day. On some days, he billed for more than 100 hours of work.
Berg had an employee count the pages of documents received in
of
particular cases, and multiply that number by three minutes to determine the
hours to be billed. Berg described his method as "bulk billing."
He did not prepare pleadings, memoranda, or other evidence
productive work on the files in question. He had no time records to support
the billings. Berg claimed that the time records had been destroyed within
90 to 180 days after each billing.
In the disciplinary proceedings, the lawyer claimed that he later
performed the work for which he had billed. But the disciplinary authorities
were unimpressed. The billing statement were fraudulent when issued. The
insurance company ultimately received a judgment against Berg for
$286,000. The disciplinary court recommended that Berg be disbarred.
D. Structured Settlement and Time Value of Money
In re Fox
490 S.E.2d 265 (S.C. 1997) (per curiam)
South Carolina attorney LaVaun Fox was publicly reprimanded for
collecting a clearly excessive fee in a contingency fee case. Fox had been
associated with another attorney, Screen, to work on a wrongful death case.
The client had agreed to a 1/3 contingency fee arrangement. The case
settled. The settlement provided for an immediate cash payment of
$175,000, and some annuities. When Screen received the lump sum
payment of $175,000, he took out $152,132 in attorneys' fees, $51,000 of
which were allocated to Fox.
The client brought an action for accounting with respect to the fee, and
there was a settlement in which Screen and Fox acknowledged error in the
calculation of the fee. Thereafter, disciplinary proceedings were undertaken
against Fox. The court described the "problem" as follows:
The problem in this case centers around the manner in which Screen
and Respondent valued the wrongful death settlement (more
specifically, the annuities made part of the settlement), and how they
collected their fee out of it. When they were calculating the
settlement, they did not discount the annuities to present value.
Instead, they added up the guaranteed payments that would be paid in
the future [and] valued the entire settlement at $371,340. From this,
they calculated their attorneys' fee at $123,255.

490 S.E.2d at 268.
An additional fee of $28,877 was paid to another attorney who had worked
on an aspect of the case, bringing the total to $152,132.
The court then said:
It is well-settled that in valuing structured settlements like the one
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here, the cost method should be used..... The premium paid to purchase
the annuity contracts here was $110,818. When added to the initial
$175,000 case payment, the settlement would be valued at $285,818.
Thus, using this figure, a one-third contingency fee would be
approximately $95,000.
If the settlement's value had been
appropriately discounted, it is obvious the fees paid here were
excessive....
Valuing the settlement based on guaranteed future payments or total
cash payout would most likely not have presented an ethical problem
had the fee not then been taken up-front (i.e. out of present-day
dollars). A basic understanding of the value of money over time
would indicate this method, oftaking the fee from present-day dollars
but not valuing the annuity at present-day dollars, would result in a
windfall for the attorneys.
Id.at 268-69.
And even though Screen did the calculations on the fees, the court said
that it was appropriate to discipline Fox. Fox had been included in theof
a
settlement discussions,
he was aware of how the settlement was being
valued for purposes ofcalculating attorneys' fees, and how the fees were
be paid from up-front money. So he was publicly reprimanded.
E. Confidentiality
One of the most basic duties of a lawyer is to maintain the
a
confidentiality of client information. Rule 1.6(a) of the Rules
Professional Conduct provides, among other things, that "[a] lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation ofa client unless the client
consents after consultation." Rule 1.8(b) further provides that "A lawyer
shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation."
Sometimes a lawyer can encounter more than ethical problems with respect
to the misuse of client information.
U.S. v. O'Hagan
117 S.Ct. 2199 (U.S. 1997)
The Dorsey law firm was engaged to represent Grand Met in
proposed acquisition of the Pillsbury Co. A Dorsey lawyer, who was not
involved in the representation itself, learned of the proposed acquisition,
and began to buy shares ofstock and options in Pillsbury. When he started
his purchases, Pillsbury was selling for $39 per share. After Grand Met
announced tender offer, the price rose to nearly $60 per share. The lawyer
made a $4.3 million profit.
The SEC investigated. The lawyer was indicted for defrauding his law
firm and his client by using non-public information for his own trading
purposes. He was alleged to have used the profits to conceal previous
embezzlement and conversion of client trust funds. He was convicted and
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sentenced to prison.
The lawyer in this case was an "outsider," rather than a company
"insider." The principal issue before the Court was whether he could be
properly convicted of securities fraud for making unauthorized use of
company information for personal gain. The Court said yes.
The Court said that a fiduciary who pretends loyalty to the principal
while secretly converting the principal's information for personal gain
defrauds the principal. 117 S. Ct. at 2208. "A company's confidential
information ... qualifies as property to which the company has a right of

exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in
violation of a fiduciary duty ...constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement." Id.

Furthermore, if such misappropriation occurs in
(citations omitted).
connection with the purchase of securities, and without disclosure to the
principal, the misappropriator may violate federal law. Said the Court:
We turn next to the §l0(b) requirement that the misappropriator's
or connection with the purchase
deceptive use of information be "in
sale of [a] security." This element is satisfied because the fiduciary's
fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential
information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the
information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction
and the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the
person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is,
instead, the source ofthe nonpublic information.... A misappropriator
who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information ...gains his

advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the
source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the
investing public.
Id.
However, the Court said that if the government were to succeed with
its misappropriation theory it would also need to show that there had been a
in
willful violation ofRule Ob-5 and that the defendant had knowledge ofthe
rule. The Court also concluded that the lawyer's conduct could be found to
violate Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a), which prohibit securities trading
based on material non-public information about a tender offer. The critical
point, of course, is that a lawyer who "misappropriates" client information
could be subject to criminal liability.
F. Insurance Company Control of Settlement
Formal Opinion 96-403
2,
ABA Ethics Committee
In this opinion, issued August 1996, the ABA Ethics Committee
considered a problem that comes up in insurance cases: how does the
lawyer, hired by the insurer to represent the insured, deal with a provision
the insurance policy that authorizes the insurer to control the defense and
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settlement of the claim in its sole discretion, without consultation with the
insured?
The Committee initially noted that the insurance contract itself does
not define the lawyer's ethical obligations, and that the "essential point of
ethics involved is that the lawyer so employed shall represent the insured as
his client with undivided fidelity." Opinion at 2. If the lawyer is to
proceed with the representation at the direction of the insurer, the
Committee said that the lawyer must "make appropriate disclosure
sufficient to apprise the insured ofthe limited nature ofthe representation as
well as the insurer's right to control the defense." Id.
The Committee considered the potential relevance of Model Rule 1.2,
which provides, in part, that "[a] lawyer shall abide by aifclient's decision
concerning the objectives ofrepresentation," and that "[a] lawyer may limit
the objectives of the representation the client consents after consultation."
In this situation, the Committee said the lawyer's obligations would be
satisfied by a "short letter clearly stating that the lawyer intends to proceed
at the direction ofthe insurer in accordance with the terms of the insurance
contract and what this means to the insured." Id. No formal acceptance by
the client ofthis arrangement is necessary, said the Committee. The insured
would manifest consent to the limited representation by accepting the
offered defense after being advised of the terms on which it is offered.
Ifinsurer and insured should later disagree about whether a proposed
settlement is acceptable, or about who has the right to decide that question,
the Committee said that the attorney may consult with his client or clients as
to a proposed course ofaction, or advise them to seek independent counsel.
Thus, for example, the lawyer might remind the insured that the policy
gives the insurer the right to control the defense and settle the claim without
the consent of the insured or that rejecting the proposed settlement might
result in a forfeiture of rights under the policy. Ultimately, however,
although the insurer hired the lawyer and pays his fee, the insured retains
the power to reject the defense offered by the insurer under the policy and
to assume the risk and expense of his own defense. Id. at
In most cases, noted the Committee, an insured would be delighted to
have litigation resolved within policy limits. It said:
So long as the lawyer has apprised the insured ofthe limitations on the
representation offered under the insurance policy and the insurer's
right to settle the matter ... and the lawyer does not know that the

insured objects to the proposed settlement within policy limits, the
lawyer may follow the directions of the insurer to settle, without
further communication with the insured. In the unusual case addressed
in this opinion, however, where the lawyer knows that the insured
objects to a settlement within policy limits, the lawyer must give the
insured an opportunity to reject the defense offered by the insurer and
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to assume responsibility for his own defense at his own expense.
Id. at 3-4.
G. Conflicts of Interest When Representing Lawyers
The principal conflict of interest rule is Rule 1.7. The Louisiana
version provides:
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client.
Therefore:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(2)
will not
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client the representation
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
The client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
A recent decision of the ABA Standing Committee on 1.Ethics and
Professional Responsibility discusses some conflicts that can arise when
one lawyer takes on the representation of another.
Formal Opinion 97-406
ABA Ethics Committee
The specific situation that the Committee considered was when one
lawyer takes on the representation of another at a time when the two each
have clients with adverse interests.
The Committee said that "[w]hen one lawyer represents another, the
ethical propriety of their representing persons whose interests are directly
adverse depends upon the effect of such representation on each lawyer's
ability to represent his 'third party' client in full compliance with the Model
Rules." Opinion at
The situation was governed by Rule 1.7(b). The
critical question was whether the relationship between the two lawyers
might materially limit the representation provided to either oftheir clients.
The Committee said:
One lawyer's duty.to, or interest in the work of the other lawyer may
materially limit the lawyer's representation of his third- party client
any case in which the relationship between the lawyers might cause

if
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either or both ofthem to temper advocacy on behalf oftheir opposing
third-party clients. For example, a material limitation may exist if a
representing lawyer is unwilling to seek sanctions against his
opponent, who is also his client, because he is solicitous of the
represented lawyer's reputation. Similarly, a material limitation may
exist for a represented lawyer if she is unwilling to relay her third party
client's demand to advance a transaction closing out of concern that to
do so would distract her opponent -- who is also her lawyer -- from

E

working on the matter in which he represents her.
--3)
Opinion at 2. 3.
E a variety of considerations were relevant to
2)The Committee
EE.
said that
Id.
the ethics question, including: 1) the importance of the matter to the
represented lawyer; the size of theaexpected fee; the "sensitivity" of
each matter; and 4) the nature of the relationship between the lawyers.
to
The Committee also considered the extent to which this sort ofconflict
of interest would be imputed to other lawyers in the firm. "It is
fundamental principle," said the Committee, "that the duties that one lawyer
has to a client are shared by all lawyers in his firm."
at
See Rule
1.10, Rules of Professional Conduct.' The Committee concluded that the
conflict, if there is one, could be imputed to other lawyers in the law firm,
but the analysis was different for the representing lawyer than for the
represented lawyer.
The Committee said that if the representing lawyer is disqualified,
under 1.7(b), from representing a third-party client adverse to the
represented lawyer, then all other lawyers with whom the representing
lawyer is associated are also disqualified.
But the concept of imputed disqualification need not disqualify all
lawyers associated with a representedlawyer. The Committee gave an
example:
[I]f lawyer D represents lawyer in a purely personal matter for
example, the sale of E's house or estate planning for and her
husband it is hard to see why Rule 1.10 should be read to impute the
disqualification that concludes that she personally has to all lawyers
associated with No purpose generally thought to be served by Rule
1.10 is served by such an application. Automatic imputation would
either deter lawyers from seeking out, as their own counsel, lawyers
whom they know best or may deem most qualified, or require that any
lawyer having any personal legal matter register the name of the
lawyer that represents him in his own firm's conflict data base,
Model Rule 1.10(a) states: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2."
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assure that the possibility of disqualification, however remote, is
considered in future conflicts checks.
.... It is unreasonable to assume that all lawyers in the firm share the
personal reservations that may lead one lawyer in the firm to conclude
that she cannot be an effective advocate for a third party against
lawyer who also represents her.
Id. at 4.
The Committee acknowledged that its reading of the imputed
disqualification rule went beyond the literal language of Rule 1.10, but said
that it was working on a draft exception to the rule that was consistent with
its views in this opinion. Opinion at footnote 11.

H. Communicating with Persons Represented by Counsel - When
the Government is Involved
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
A recent decision of the ABA Ethics Committee considers how the rule
applies when the lawyer desires to communicate with a government official.

Formal Opinion 97-408
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
The committee said that the no-contact rule "provide[s] protection of
the represented person against overreaching by adverse counsel,
safeguard[s] the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse
counsel, and reduce[s] the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or
other information that might harm their interests." Opinion at 2. The text
of the rule does not identify the persons with whom contact is forbidden,
but the committee said that the commentary "makes clear that the rule's
protections extend to represented organizations as well as individuals." Id.
But the commentary indicates that some communications with government
representatives might be allowed because of the "authorized by law"
exception in the text of the rule. The official comments to the rule state:
"Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of
a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with
government officials about the matter." Id.
The committee concluded that Rule 4.2 "is generally applicable to
communications by lawyers with represented government entities." But it
also said: "At the same time, we also agree that the no-contact rule must
not be applied so as to frustrate a citizen's right to petition, exercised by
direct communication with government decision makers, through a lawyer."
Id. This means, according to the committee, that Rule 4.2 "permits a
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lawyer representing a private party in a controversy with the government to
communicate directly with government decision makers in certain limited
circumstances within the ambit ofthe right to petition, even though it would
in the same circumstances prohibit communication with a represented
private person or organization without consent ofcounsel." Id.at 3.
However, the committee said that "the most responsible way" to
accommodate the "tension between a citizen's right of access and the
government's right to be protected from uncounselled communications"
would be to make the lawyer contacts subject to two conditions.
First, the government official to be contacted must have authority to
take or recommend action in the controversy, and the sole purpose of
the communication must be to address a policy issue, including settling
the controversy.
Second ... the Committee believes it essential to ensure that

government officials will have an opportunity to be advised by counsel
in making the decision whether to grant an interview with the lawyer
for a private party seeking redress. Thus the lawyer for the private
party must always give government counsel advance notice that it
intends to communicate with officials of the agency to afford such
officials an opportunity to discuss with government counsel the
advisability of entertaining the communication. When the lawyer for
the private party wishes to communicate in writing with government
officials, the policy of fairness embodied in the rule also dictates that
in
the lawyer must give government counsel copies of the written
material at a time and in a fashion that will afford her a meaningful
opportunity to advise the officials whether to receive theit
communication from the lawyer for the other side.
Id.
On the other hand, "[i]n situations where the right to petition the
government has no applicability, either because it is not the sole purpose
the contact to address a policy issue or because the government officials
with whom the lawyer wishes to communicate are not authorized to take or
recommend action in the matter, Rule 4.2 should be considered fully
applicable to a lawyer's communications with officials of a represented
government entity, just as it would apply to lawyer's communications with
officials of a private organization." Id.
The committee pointed out that Rule 4.2 did not prohibit
communications that had nothing to do with the representation. And
noted that "whistle blower" statutes, or other statutes, may authorize
lawyers who represent clients to receive information from government
officials without consent of government counsel.
I. IOLTA

Mandatory IOLTA programs require lawyers to place client funds
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interest bearing accounts and require the interest to be forwarded to an
organization that uses the funds to pay for indigent legal services and other
purposes. The Louisiana IOLTA rules are set forth in Rule 1.15 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
Questions have sometimes arisen about the constitutionality of
mandatory IOLTA schemes. A recent decision of the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Texas program is
unconstitutional.
Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation,
94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2535 (U.S. 1997)
In 1996, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the constitutionality ofthe Texas IOLTA program. It held that the program
amounted to an impermissible taking of interest, at least to the extent that
clients whose money was deposited in IOLTA accounts did not assent to the
state's use of the interest generated on those funds. The conventional
wisdom in favor of these mandatory schemes is that no taking results
because, in there were no IOLTA program, the deposits of client money
would produce no interest in the first place. That is, absent IOLTA,
attorneys would deposit client funds into non-interest bearing accounts.
a The Fifth Circuit rejected the conventional wisdom. It questioned the
idea that IOLTA schemes "have unlocked the magic that eluded the
alchemists." It saw the interest proceeds "not as the fruit ofalchemy, but as
the fruit ofthe clients' principal deposits." The "traditional rule that interest
follows principal must apply." 94 F.3d at 1004.
Other courts that have considered the issue have upheld the validity of
IOLTA schemes, on the theory that if there were no IOLTA program the
deposits ofclient money would not produce any interest. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in June, 1997.
J. E-Mail and Confidentiality
Some ethics committees have begun to consider whether the lawyer's
use of electronic mail may run afoul of the obligation of confidentiality that
arises under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The issue
recently came before the North Dakota State Bar Association Ethics
Committee.
Opinion 97-09
North Dakota State Bar Association Ethics Committee
The committee said that the lawyer's duty under Rule 1.6 not to reveal
information relating to the representation implies that a lawyer should have
reasonable expectation that the means of communication used will
maintain confidentiality. It noted that some ethics opinions had concluded
that a lawyer violates confidentiality obligations
the lawyer uses
unencrypted e-mail without first discussing the risk of disclosure with the
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client and obtaining client consent for the use. But it also noted that recent
and "well-reasoned" opinions have concluded that a lawyer may
communicate "routine" matters by using unencrypted e-mail without
violating Rule 1.6. Further, the committee said that
[i]n view of improvements in technology and changes in law, there
now exists a reasonable certainty and expectation that unencrypted email may be regarded as confidential. Although interception of
electronic messages is possible, it is no less difficult than intercepting
an ordinary telephone call.
The committee's opinion includes1. some discussion of Internet
technology. It also refers to provisions ofthe United States Code making it
illegal to intercept e-mail communications and providing that interception
does not destroy the otherwise-privileged character of such
communications. See 18 U.S.C. 2511 and 18 U.S.C. 2517(4). See also
Opinion 97-5, Vermont Bar Association Committee on Professional
Responsibility (lawyer does not violate confidentiality obligation by using
e-mail to communicate with client).
K. Web Sites and Lawyer Advertising
A Utah ethics committee recently issued an opinion that discusses
lawyer advertising on a web page.
Opinion 97-10
Utah State Bar,
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee
October 24, 1997
The committee said that "a potential client's access to information
through a web site is analogous to telephoning the firm or visiting the
Web site advertising should
lawyer's office to request information."
a
against
false
and misleading advertising,
therefore comply with the rules
retention of copies, inclusion of the name of a lawyer responsible for the
advertising and the rule on listing fields ofpractice.
On the retention of copies requirement, the committee said:
[A]n attorney must retain copy of each page of a web site, not just
the "home page." Effective web sites are updated and changed
regularly, perhaps even daily, and retaining hard copy ofeach update
may not be efficient or practical. To satisfy Rule 7.2(b), attorneys may
elect to keep an electronic copy of the each page for the requisite two
years.
Opinion at
The committee was also of the view, however, that a simple listing of
name, street address, electronic address, and facsimile number would not
amount to "advertising," and would not require copy retention.
The committee noted that "chat rooms" have become popular on
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Internet sites. But it warned attorneys against using chat rooms for
advertising and solicitation:
The typical format involves simultaneous participation of several users
in a real-time exchange or written messages at a common site that are
displayed at each participant's computer terminal. Although these
communications can often be reduced to written form, a chat-group
communication is more analogous to an in-person conversation due to
its direct, confrontational nature and the difficulty of monitoring and
regulating it. We, therefore, find that an attorney's advertising and
solicitation through a chat group are "in person" communications
under Rule 7.3(a) and are accordingly restricted by the provisions of
that rule.
Opinion at 2.
The Committee also looked into the applicability ofthe rules to e-mail
communications. Unlike the chat-room discussions, e-mail transmissions
a are like written advertisements
a
are not "live." They
that can be ignored. On
the other hand, the committee thought that the speed and mode of e-mail
communications13can have a "different impact" than a written advertisement.
In some instances, that impact might translate into prohibited "coercion,
duress, or harassment." Id.
The committee also mentioned an unauthorized practice oflaw issue.
A web site advertisement might induce someone from another jurisdiction
to ask for legal help. The committee indicated that if the lawyer provides
legal advice to such a person, the lawyer might run afoul ofthe prohibitions
against unauthorized practice.
On a related note, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently imposed
one-year suspension on an attorney for a massive e-mail advertising
campaign. The attorney, Canter, posted an immigration law advertisement
to thousands of Internet groups and lists. The lawyer did not include
mandatory disclaimer ("This is an advertisement") in the ad. He did not
supply regulatory authorities with a copy of it. A hearing committee had
found that the e-mail campaign had intruded on recipients' privacy rights
and had forced recipients to pay for unwanted advertising. See News and
Background, 13 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual ofProfessional Conduct
(July 23, 1997).
L. Non-Lawyer Employees and Imputed Disqualification

Lawyers are generally aware that "migratory lawyers" may bring
conflicts of interest with them when they move to a new law firm. In some
instances, those conflicts will be imputed to all ofthe members of the new
law firm. Thus, Rule 1.10(b) states:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not
knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was
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associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 [confidentially rule] and
1.9(b) [former client rule] that is material to the matter.
What about "migratory secretaries"? In the following case, the Nevada
Supreme Court concludes that disqualification of a law firm may result
from the migration of a secretary.
Ciaffone v. Eighth Judicial District Court

945 P.2d 950 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam)
Members of the Ciaffone family sued the Skyline Restaurant over the
shooting death of Joseph Ciaffone. The Gillock firm represented the
Ciaffones. The Thorndal firm represented the restaurant.
While the litigation was going on, Ingrid Decker was employed by the
Thorndal firm as a "temp" in the word processing unit. A few weeks after
starting work in word processing, Decker was hired directly by the firm to
be a secretary to Clark, a lawyer at the firm.
Clark did not work on the Ciaffone litigation, but Decker was assigned
to do some limited "overflow" work on the case while she worked for
Clark. Clark eventually left the firm. After he did so, Decker "floated" for
awhile, at one time working for a few days for Marshall, the attorney of
record in the Ciaffone case.
few months after Clark left the Thorndal firm, Decker did also. She
a
was employed to be a secretary at the Gillock
firm, and she was assigned to
in
the
Ciaffone case. Two months
for
the
attorney
of
record
be the secretary
after Decker started work at the Gillock firm, the Thorndal firm moved to
disqualify the Gillock firm from the litigation, based on Decker's
involvement in the Ciaffone litigation.
Decker denied that she had done any work on the Ciaffone case during
the brief time she worked for Marshall, while she was "floating" at the
Thorndal firm, but she admitted that she may have done some limited work
on the case while she was word processor. After Decker came to work at
the Gillock firm, the new firm "made efforts to screen Decker from any
involvement in the Ciaffone" case. 945 P.2d at 952.
The trial court granted the motion to disqualify. The Nevada Supreme
Court analyzed the case in light of the language of two "ethics" rules, SCR
160(2) and SCR 187, which are equivalent to Louisiana Rules 1.10(b)
(quoted above) and 5.3 (which deals with "Responsibilities Regarding
Nonlawyer Assistants"). The latter rule is the one that requires supervising
lawyers to take "reasonable efforts" to ensure that the conduct ofnonlawyer
personnel "is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."
And the court concluded:
When SCR 187 is read in conjunction with SCR 160(2), nonlawyer
employees become subject to the same rules governing imputed
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disqualification. To hold otherwise would grant less protection to the
confidential and privileged information obtained by a nonlawyer than
that obtained by a lawyer. . . . [W]e conclude that the policy of

protecting the attorney-client privilege must be preserved through
imputed disqualification when a nonlawyer employee, in possession of
privileged information, accepts employment with a firm who
represents a client with materially adverse interests.
945 P.2d at 953.
The court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to the trial court to
reinstate the disqualified firm.
IV. Orders of the Louisiana Supreme Court
A. CLE
Louisiana lawyers are now required to add another subject to their
annual CLE quota: professionalism. By order dated May 23, 1997, the
Louisiana Supreme Court amended Rule 3(c) of the Rules for Continuing
Legal Education to read as follows:
(c) Of the fifteen (15) hours of CLE required annually, not less than
one (1) of such hours shall concern legal ethics, and not less than one
(1) of such hours shall concern professionalism.
Order of May 23, 1997.
Whatis is the difference between legal ethics and professionalism?
lawyer's
Amended Rule
3(c) also states:
lawyer's
Legal ethics concerns the standard of professional conduct and
responsibility required of a lawyer. It includes courses on professional
responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as
attorneys' fees, client development, law office economics, and practice is
systems, except to the extent that professional responsibility
discussed in connection with these topics.
Professionalism concerns the knowledge and skill of the law faithfully
employed in the service of client and public good, and entails what
more broadly expected of attorneys. It includes courses on the duties
of attorneys to the
system, courts, public, clients, and other
attorneys; attorney competency; and pro bono obligations.
Order of May 23, 1997.
The distinction is also discussed in an amendment to Regulation 4.1(b):
Topics eligible for CLE credit in satisfaction of the Professionalism
requirement include the
responsibility as an officer of the
court; the lawyer's responsibility to treat fellow lawyers, members of
the bench, and clients with respect and dignity; misuse and abuse of
discovery and litigation; the lawyer's responsibility to protect the
image of the profession; the
responsibility generally to the
public service; the lawyer's duty to be informed about methods of
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dispute resolution and to counsel clients accordingly.
Order of May 23, 1997.
The change became effective on January 1, 1998.
B. Subpoenas of Lawyers by Prosecutors
In December of 1996, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit
challenging Rule 3.8(f) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.
The rule limited the ability ofa prosecutor to "subpoena a lawyer in a grand
jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present
client unless ...[among other things] ..."the prosecutor obtains prior judicial
approval after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding."
Federal rules were less restrictive with respect to attorney subpoenas.
The Department ofJustice contended that the Louisiana rule was preempted
by federal law that regulates subpoenas, grand jury secrecy, and the
attorney-client privilege. The DOJ lawsuit sought a declaration that the rule
was null and void as to federal prosecutors, and an injunction barring the
named defendants from enforcing it. The named defendants were the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the Louisiana State Bar Association, the
disciplinary board, and the disciplinary counsel. U.S. v. Louisiana Supreme
Court, No. 967-7580 (M.D. La., filed 12/23/96). See Justice Department
Sues in La., State Rules Hinder Confidential Criminal Probes, Suit Says,
New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 27, 1996, at A2
On June 1,1997, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered an amendment
to the rule that removed the requirement of prior judicial approval. The
change was effective upon signing. See Order of June 11, 1997. After the
order was entered, the parties to the lawsuit stipulated to a dismissal without
prejudice.
9,
C. Power of Attorney
On April 30, 1997, the Supreme Court ordered an amendment to Rule
1.8 ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct, effective June 1,1997. The order
adds new subpart (k) to the Rule, as follows:
(k) A lawyer shall not solicit or obtain a power of attorney or mandate
from a client which would authorize the attorney, without first
obtaining the client's informed consent to settle, to enter into a binding
settlement agreement on the client's behalf or to execute on behalf
the client any settlement or release documents. An attorney may
obtain client's authorization to endorse and negotiate an instrument
given in settlement of the client's claim, but only after the client has
approved the settlement.
D. Disciplinary Enforcement
On September 25, 1997, October 1997, and on November 10, 1997,
the Supreme Court ordered some amendments to the Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement. As a result of the changes, the Rules now

of
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...

include a new section 19B on "Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm."
The new section provides, in part:
A. ...Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer
subject to the disciplinary
.... jurisdiction of this court has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or is under a disability
as herein defined and poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the
public, disciplinary counsel shall:
transmit the evidence to the court together with a proposed order fora
interim suspension
B. Upon examination of the evidence transmitted to the court by
disciplinary counsel and of rebuttal evidence, if any, which the lawyer
has transmitted to the court prior to the court's ruling, the court may
enter an order immediately suspending the lawyer, pending final
disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the conduct
causing the harm; may order the lawyer to show cause, before
hearing committee panel appointed by the board, why the court should
not issue an immediate interim suspension; or may order such other
action as it deems appropriate.
The amendments became effective on October 1997, and November
10, 1997.

V. Louisiana Legislation
A. Structured Settlements
or Recent legislation limits the liability of attorneys in recommending or
or
or
which
was
approved
on
July
settlements.
RS
37:222,
negotiating structured
1997, provides, in part:
An attorney who acts in good faith shall not be liable for any loss
damages as a result of any act or omission in negotiating
recommending a structured settlement of a claim or the particular
mechanism or entity for the funding thereof or in depositing
investing settlement funds in a particular entity, unless the loss
damage was caused by his willful or wanton misconduct.
The statute also provides that good faith is "presumed to exist" when
the attorney negotiates with or invests in an entity that is "funded,
guaranteed, or bonded by an insurance company" with a "minimum rating

of "A+9" "Double A", or the equivalent.
B. Law Firms and Title Insurance
R.S. 12:804 was recently amended to provide as follows:
A professional law corporation shall engage in no business other than
the practice of law, but may hold property for investment or in
connection with its legal practice. A professional law corporation may

hold a title insurance agency license and serve as a title insurance
agent in accordance with Title 22 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of
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1950.

And R.S. 22:1113(BO(4) was enacted to provide:
Any professional law corporation formed pursuant to R.S. 12:801 et
seq. or any limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or
partnership formed for the practice of law, as authorized by R.S.
37:213, may be licensed as a title insurance agent or title insurance
agency.
1.
The changes were approved on July 3, 1997.
VI. Selected Louisiana Cases
A. Attorney Misconduct

Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate(c)the Rules of Professional Conduct...;
(b) Commit a criminal act especially one that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects;
Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
justice.
Several recent cases illustrate how misconduct can arise.
Faked Automobile Accident
In re Caulfield
683 So. 2d 714 (La. 1996)
Caulfield, an attorney, and Miller, a former police department
employee, were alleged to have staged a fake automobile accident in New

Orleans for the purpose of defrauding the Hertz Corporation and its insurer.
A rental car operated by Miller collided with the rear end of a car
owned and operated by Caulfield. Miller told the investigating police
officer that he had been driving fast because he was anxious to reach his
girlfriend's house, and that he had been blinded by sunlight immediately
before the collision. After the accident, Caulfield filed a personal injury
lawsuit against Miller, Hertz, and Hertz's insurer. He complained of neck
pain caused by the accident.
When Hertz inspected the vehicles after the "accident," it began to

suspect that the thing had been staged. Evidence at a resulting RICO trial
showed that Caulfield and Miller had been acquainted with each other prior
to the accident. It showed that Miller was a person of limited financial
resources, who could not afford insurance for his own car; however, just
before the accident, Miller had rented a car from Hertz at a cost of $141.27,
allegedly because his own car was not running well, and Miller also
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obtained $1million in liability insurance from Hertz in connection with the
rental. There was evidence that Miller had been employed as a "runner" at
Caulfield's law firm prior to the time of the accident. A jury in the civil
RICO trial returned a verdict against Caulfield and Miller in the amount of
$410,528.88.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel charged Caulfield with staging a
fake automobile accident, and it introduced the entire record of the civil
RICO trial into the disciplinary proceedings. After reviewing the record,
and after taking additional testimony, the Hearing Committee recommended
that Caulfield be disbarred.
Before the Supreme Court, Caulfield contended that the disciplinary
authorities had given too much weight to the record in the RICO trial and
that, in any event, there was no clear and convincing evidence that he had
staged an automobile accident.
The Supreme Court found that the disciplinary authorities had properly
applied the clear and convincing standard of evidence. And it concluded
that there was "more than ample evidence under the clear and convincing
standard, that [Caulfield] staged an automobile accident." 683 So. 2d at
717.
On the question of sanctions, the Court said:
The act of staging a fake automobile accident in order to collect money
violates the ethical duty Respondent owes to the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession. This court has previously imposed
the sanction of disbarment upon attorneys who stage automobile
accidents....
... [W]e agree with the Hearing Committee and Disciplinary Board

that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.
Id. at 719.
2. Negligent Homicide
In re Brown
674 So. 2d 243 (La. 1996)
Attorney Brown was convicted of negligent homicide in the death of
Gills, with whom she had lived for four years. Following an argument with
Gills at their residence, Brown picked up a gun from beneath her bed. It
"went off," wounding Gills in the chest. She died a short time later.
Brown's criminal conviction was the basis of a subsequent charge that she
had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In considering the case, the Louisiana Supreme Court said that
conviction of a crime may warrant discipline, "even though the crime was
not directly connected with the practice of law." 674 So. 2d at 246. It also
said the following about the purpose of lawyer discipline:
The purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to
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punish the lawyer but rather to maintain appropriate standards of
professional conduct to safeguard the public, to preserve the integrity
of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in
violations of the standards ofthe profession.
Id.at 245.
Decisions from other jurisdictions indicated that suspension was
appropriate sanction for negligent homicide or vehicular homicide.
However, the court noted that a "gun, unlike an automobile, is an inherently
Id. 674 So. 2d at 245. In this case, said the court, "the
dangerous weapon."
gun, an inanimate object, did not kill Brenda Gillis. Brenda Brown killed
Brenda Gillis. The gun required human volition and Brenda Brown's overt
action to kill."
at 249. The court concluded that disbarment was the
appropriate sanction:
The gravity of the crime reflects heavily on respondent's fitness to
practice law. We cannot overlook the fact
(3 that respondent's actions
resulted in the senseless destruction ofa life and will obviously forever
change the lives ofthe victim's family, particularly, the victim's minor
children. The actual resulting injury could not have been more severe.
Moreover, respondent demonstrated a violent reaction to an
admittedly non-threatening situation. Her response to this apparently
stressful situation creates concern regarding her continued ability to
represent clients given the pressures associated with the practice of
law. The sanction imposed must, ofnecessity, reasonably correspond
with the gravity of the misconduct. Accordingly, under the
circumstances of this particular case, we conclude that respondent's
conviction of negligent homicide warrants disbarment.
Id.

Cf., In re Bowman, 679 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1996) (Attorney suspended
from practice after being convicted of "driving under the influence
resulting in death").
3. Phony Medical Records
In re Castro
699 So. 2d 382 (La. 1997)

Castro was charged with four counts of insurance fraud for altering
and forging four medical records of a physical therapist. He did this to
induce insurers to pay larger settlements in personal injury cases. The total
financial injury to the insurance companies was $1,800.
Castro pleaded not guilty, and blamed the forged records on "an
apparently non-existent paralegal." During plea negotiations, Castro
admitted that he had fabricated the story about the paralegal.
years, suspended, with
After receiving his criminal sentence
probation, community service, and restitution requirements), Castro was
charged by disciplinary counsel with misconduct. The Supreme Court
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ordered disbarment. It said:
We agree ... that the crime of which respondent was convicted is one

that strikes directly a[t] public trust in the profession. This court has
. . .

disbarred attorneys for similar conduct.

Several aggravating

factors exist in this case: dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, and submission of false statements
during the disciplinary process. While we recognize that respondent is
not experienced in the practice of law, this lack of experience is
actually an aggravating circumstance under the facts of this case.
Respondent began his dishonest conduct almost immediately upon
act" in his first five
commencing practice and was "caught in thejudge
months of practice. His brief time in practice leaves him totally
without any time in practice to point to as an example of honest
conduct. Further, although respondent now shows some remorse for
his actions, we note that for more than a year, respondent failed to takea
responsibility for his actions and attempted to blame them on
fictitious paralegal.
699 So. 2d 384.
4. Nonpayment of Taxes
In re Mitchell
681 So. 2d 339 (La. 1996)
Attorney Mitchell pleaded guilty to failure to file income tax returns.
He was fined $1000 and placed on criminal probation for one year. After
the criminal sanction came down, disciplinary proceedings were initiated,
(18
on the theory that the criminal conviction amounted to misconduct under
Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Louisiana Supreme
Court ordered that Mitchell be suspended from the practice of law for a year
and a day, but it deferred the suspension, and placed Mitchell on a two year
probation, during which he was ordered to satisfy a number of requirements
imposed by the court. See also In re Shealy, 700 So. 2d 488 (La. 1997)
(One-year suspension, all but six months deferred, and probation, for failure
to file income tax return); In re Thomas, 700 So. 2d 490 (15 month
suspension, all but nine months deferred, and two years of probation, for
failure to file income tax return); In re Stout, 694 So. 2d 908 (La. 1997)
month suspension, with six months deferred, for failing to file tax returns
for 8 years); In re Huckaby, 694 So. 2d 906 (La. 1997) (per curiam) (One
year suspension, with six months deferred, for failure to file a 1987 tax
required that he be
return; the fact that the attorney had been a district
held to a higher than usual standard; he had previously been removed from
office after pleading guilty to a criminal charge based on the failure to file
the tax return).
B. Contingent Fees
Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states, in part:
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A contingenttofee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the
method
A by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage
or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted
from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted
before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
1. Oral Contingent Fees
&
on Rules of
An oral contingent fee agreement violates the
Professional
Conduct. It can also cause other problems.
A
Tschirn v. Secor Bank
691 So. 2d 1290 (La. Ct. App. 1997),
writ denied, 701 So. 2d 172 (La. 1997)
Tschirn, an attorney, asked Kohnke, a lawyer at Lemle Kelleher,
represent him in lawsuit against Secor Bank. Kohnke agreed to undertake
the representation. couple ofyears later, Kohnke and some other lawyers
left the Lemle firm and established the Frilot firm. Tschim decided to have
Kohnke continue to represent him in the litigation with Secor.
There had been discussions between Kohnke and Tschirn about fees,
but no fee agreement was ever reduced to writing. The partners of the
Lemle firm and the departing partners who formed the Frilot firm entered
into a Separation Agreement that set forth the terms of the withdrawal from
the Lemle partnership. There was a notation in the agreement that Kohnke
had agreed to an oral contingency contract with Tschirn in the Secor Bank
case of 1/3 of the recovery plus reimbursement of costs. subsequent fee
sharing agreement stated that any recovery obtained was to be split evenly
between the two firms. Tschirn acknowledged the terms of the agreement
as well.
Following the conclusion of trial in the Secor Bank case, the jury
returned with a verdict of $1.2 million in favor of Tschirn. Defendants
issued a draft in the amount of $1.2 million payable to Tschirn, the Frilot
dispute then arose over the amount of the
firm and the Lemle firm.
contingent fee. Lemle contended that the fee was to be calculated on the
gross recovery plus reimbursement of expenses incurred by the firm.
Tschirn, Kohnke and Frilot contended that the fee was to be calculated on
the amount of the net recovery after deduction ofexpenses that Tschirn had
paid during the proceedings. The difference between these two calculations
was $10,628.07. The disputed funds were held in escrow.
After a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor ofLemle
the amount in dispute. Then the issue came before the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal. It reversed.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Fee Sharing Agreement did not
specifically state that the contingent fee would be calculated on the "gross
recovery." In any event, that agreement was not a contingency fee contract.
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But there was testimony from Kohnke and Tschim that they had agreed that
Tschirn would pay the costs ofthe litigation and that those costs would be
deducted from the recovery before the contingent fee would be calculated.
The court then stated:
[W]e find that Rule 1.5 requires that a contingency fee agreement be in
if deducted before or
writing and must specify if the expenses are to be
after the fee is calculated. However, if the attorney and client enter
in
into a binding oral contingency fee agreement, we hold that any
attorney
ambiguity in the agreement shall be construed against the
favor of the client.
691 So. 2d at 1294.
Lemle lost this battle, but still was paid $189,371.93, plus costs.
2. Meeting of the Minds

Even when a contingent fee agreement is reduced to writing, questions
can still arise about the enforceability ofthe agreement.
Buruzs v. Buruzs

686 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
Buruzs, an appliance repairman, took his son with him on a serviceif
call. While his son, age 4, was waiting in the van, the van caught on fire
and the child died.
Buruzs consulted with attorney Dunn, and signed a contingency fee
contract. The agreement provided for a one-third of recovery fee
settlement were reached without filing suit and 40% suit were filed.
Dunn asked attorney Wimberly to work with him on the case. They
sued the manufacturers ofa wheelchair lift, Buruzs' former spouse, and her
insurer. A settlement for policy limits ($100,000) was reached with the
insurer. However, Buruzs refused to sign the authorization to settle and
sent Dunn a letter discharging Dunn as his lawyer. Buruzs apparently
expressed an intention to settle the case on his own. Dunn thereafter
intervened in the litigation, claiming that he was entitled to $40,000.
The trial court found that Dunn had been discharged for cause. This
resulted in a conclusion that Dunn was entitled to quantum meruit recovery
instead of the percentage of the settlement amount set forth in the fee
agreement.
Buruzs claimed that he had not read the contingency fee agreement,
had not been given a copy of it, and had not employed Dunn to file suit
against his former wife and her insurer. He claimed that he had wanted to
handle that claim on his own, and that he wanted Dunn to handle claims
against the lift company and Ford Motor Corporation.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision ofthe trial court, but did not
decide whether Dunn had been discharged for cause. It said:
Because we conclude there existed no meeting of the minds between
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the parties to the purported contingency contract, we hold that no
agreement came into existence....
Having so concluded, no necessity exists to consider whether Dunn
was discharged with or without cause.
686 So. 2d at 1009.
With respect to the amount owing to Dunn, the court said: "Where
there has been an enrichment in the absence ofa contract, the law implies a
promise to pay a reasonable amount of compensation." Id. at 1009. Here,2)
the trial court had concluded that Dunn's co-counsel had done "the3)
overwhelming bulk of the work," and had awarded Dunn $1500. Id. The
Fourth Circuit found no reason to disturb that result.
The court listed several facts that supported the client's position in the
litigation. They included:
1) Buruzs was not furnished a copy of the initial contract,
As soon as a contract was signed Dunn immediately asked Jesse
Wimberly to handle the claim.
Dunn, despite calls, did nothing to communicate with Buruzs.
4) Dunn filed a petition without notifying Buruzs or allowing him
review or to verify the pleadings.
Id. at 1008.
C. Securing Payment of Fees
Rule 1.8(j) of the Rules of Professional Conduct says, in part, that "[a]
lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that
the lawyer may ... [a]cquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee

or expenses."
In Saucier v. Hayes Dairy,373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979), the Louisiana
Supreme Court took a look at R.S. 37:218, which allows an attorney to
secure payment of a fee by entering into a contract with the client that
provides for payment of the fee out ofthe proceeds of the litigation, and by
it
filing the contract with the clerk of the court. One of the issues in the
Sauciercase was whether the statute was inconsistent with the predecessor
ofRule 1.8(j), which set forth the same limitation that is quoted above. The
Supreme Court did not invalidate the statute, and construed it to provide for
a "privilege granted to aid the attorney's collection of a fully earned fee."
373 So. 2d at 117.
R.S. 37:218 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
In such contract, it may be stipulated that neither the attorney nor the
client may, without the written consent of the other, settle,
compromise, release, discontinue, or otherwise dispose of the suit or
claim. Either party to the contract may, at any time, file and record
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with the clerk of court in the parish in which the suit is pending or is to
be brought or with the clerk of court in the parish of the client's
domicile.
After such filing, any settlement, compromise,
discontinuance, or other disposition made of the suit or claim by either
the attorney or the client, without the written consent of the other, is
null and void and the suit or clam shall be proceeded with as ifno such
settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition had been
made.
A recent case shows how the statute can work.
Martin v. David
3,
685 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
writ denied, 682 So. 2d 766 (La. 1996)
Martin, a hotel guest, was injured when a fire broke out at the Royal
Motel of New Iberia on June 20, 1992. Martin hired the Shea firm to
represent him in a suit against the Davids, who owned the hotel, and
Scottsdale, the hotel's insurer. Suit was filed on December 25, 1992.
Shortly after suit was filed, lawyer Calahan filed a petition to enroll as
counsel of record for Martin. He also filed an amended petition dismissing
the Davids from the suit and naming Royal Motel & Hotel, Inc. as
defendant. A week after these events, Martin executed an agreement with
Shea purporting to entitle Shea to 1/3 of any recovery Martin would obtain
in the personal injury action. Shea also moved to rescind Calahan's
enrollment. The trial court concluded that Calahan could prosecute the
litigation, observing the at the conflict between law firms had been caused
by Martin. On December
1992 Martin settled the case, executing
receipt and release agreement with Scottsdale and its corporate owner.
Martin received $150,000, 1/3 of which was distributed to Calahan as fees
under the fee agreement between Martin and Calahan.
On December 4 Shea intervened, claiming legal subrogation to
Martin's rights against defendants for fees in the amount of 1/3 of any
recovery. Martin, Calahan, and Scottsdale were all named defendants in the
intervention.
After other procedural developments had occurred, a hearing was held
on Shea's intervention petition. In May 1995, the trial court awarded Shea
$25,000 in legal fees, plus interest. All defendants were found solidarily
liable. Scottsdale, which had already paid out the settlement money,
appealed from this order.
The focus was on RS 37:218. Scottsdale contended that the statute
permits an attorney to obtain a lien against the proceeds of settlement.
Since the settlement proceeds had already been disbursed, Scottsdale
claimed that it had been absolved of personal liability. The court disagreed.
It said:
The obvious intent of La. R.S. 37:218 is to prevent a client's

a
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discharging an attorney and thereby depriving the attorney of his
earned fee. Therefore, if the attorney with a written contingency fee
contract bearing the no consent stipulation 'file(s) and records it with
the clerk of court in the parish in which the suit is pending ...', then a

defendant who disburses the settlement proceeds without ascertaining
and paying the fee to which the attorney is due, will do so to his
prejudice.
685 So. 2d at 162 (quoting from Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d

66, 70 (La. 1979).
Scottsdale raised other issues about the propriety ofsolidary liability in
if1,
Returning to
this situation, but the court found them to be unpersuasive.
R.S. 37:218, the court said:
v.
and
dismissal
to which Scottsdale was a party
Because the settlement
fee agreement, they
failed to take into account Shea's duly recorded
A
are null and void, at least as to Shea's claim for legal services
rendered. When Scottsdale disbursed the settlement proceeds without
ascertaining and paying Shea the fee to which he was due, the insurer
did
Id. so at its own prejudice.
at 163.
The court said that Scottsdale could have avoided the problem by
following its usual practice of issuing the settlement check to the claimant
and to both attorneys.
D. Tort Damages for Ethical Violations
Unethical conduct can result in formal disciplinary proceedings.
may also become the basis ofa cause of action by the client for damages.
Ratcliff Boydell
674 So. 2d 272 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
Boydell and Du Barry represented Ratcliff in a wrongful death action
after her husband had been killed in an automobile accident. Ratcliff signed
a contingency fee agreement that provided for a fee of 1/3 of the recovery
the case settled before suit were filed and 40% suit were filed. Suit was
eventually filed in 1984. In 1985, during the jury selection phase of the
trial, the case was settled for a lump sum of $225,000 plus a structured
settlement. Ratcliff elected an annuity plan calling for monthly payments
$1000 for the life ofher son, starting on January 2002, and for lump sum
payments of $25,000 in 2006, $40,000 in 2011, $60,000 in 2016, $90,000
in 2021, $130,000 in 2026, $200,000 in 2031, and $300,000 in 2036.
After delivery of the settlement documents, Ratcliff and Boydell met to
conclude the matter. dispute arose over the amount of the fee:
Boydell deducted from the $225,000.00 his forty percent or
$90,000.00 and costs of $17,217.50. He also withheld $45,000.00
which was forty percent of $112,000.00 which Boydell considered to
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be the present value ofthe annuity. Plaintiff questioned the amount of
A
the fee on the annuity and Boydell accused her of not trusting him.
She became emotional and left with the check for $72,782.50 which
she cashed.
674 So. 2d at 275.
Shortly thereafter, Ratcliff consulted with a new attorney, Barrios,
about her concerns. She then wrote a letter to Boydell questioning his view
ofthe present value ofthe annuity, and stating that she believed the present
value to be between $45,000 and $70,000. Boydell's written response
indicated that he was "very disappointed" to receive her letter, and that the
estimate "of present day value was based on information from both
attorneys and accountants, all ofwhom were quite familiar with structured
Id.get, and
settlements." Moreover, the estimate "was as accurate as one can
you willingly accepted it." Id.at 276.
Ratcliffultimately sued over the fee dispute, and the case went to trial.
The trial court rendered judgment against her original attorneys for
$98,214.00, consisting of $25,214.00 for a refund of fees, $43,000.00 for
abuse ofprocess, $12,000.00 for unethical practices, fraud and conversion,
and $18,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After further
proceedings, the trial court also awarded substantial attorneys' fees to
Ratcliff. The case was appealed.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion described what had gone wrong in the fee
calculation:
When Boydell left [the settlement] conference, he knew he was under
an obligation to determine the cost or value ofthat settlement in order
to compute the correct fee due him under his contract with plaintiff.
This information was readily available, but only from an actuary,
economist, or perhaps a broker who sells structured settlements.
certified public accountant without these additional specialties would
not be able to provide this information. Boydell knew this, but instead
of contacting someone who could provide him with the value he called
his own CPA and compounded his dereliction by posing a loaded
question to him. Boydell had concluded in his own mind that the
value of the $724,000.00 annuity was $112,000.00. He asked the CPA
to determine an interest rate which could somehow justify this figure.
Id. at 277.
Boydell's own version of events differed, but the trial court had not
believed him. After Ratcliff filed her suit, Boydell and Du Barry filed sixty
motions and exceptions and took six devolutive appeals. The Fourth Circuit
said that "[v]irtually none ofthese maneuvers was meritorious."
at 279.
They also filed suit against Ratcliff for incidental services, defamation and
malicious prosecution. They filed suit against Ratcliff's new attorney for
defamation and malicious prosecution.
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On appeal the Fourth Circuit rejected Boydell's argument that
claims of damage from fraud, unethical practice, conversion, abuse of
process and emotional distress were not cognizable becauseif they
a
involve the behavior of a lawyer. He contends that Art. V §(50(B) of
Id.
the Constitution confers jurisdiction over such behavior in the
Supreme Court. This argument is specious. The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer but a
litigant who suffers damages as a result ofa lawyer's misconduct has
perfect right to seek redress in court.
at 279.
Boydell also argued that "there is no legal authority for a court to
award tort damages to a former client for ethical violations." Id. at 280.
Id.
The court responded:
This overlooks the very basis for tort liability which is the duty-risk
concept. When a lawyer commits a breach of duty imposed by the
ethical rules and that breach is a cause in fact of his client's damage,
she has a right to recover in tort. The fact that the Supreme Court
might also take disciplinary action against him hardly deprives her of
her tort remedy.

a
Id.

Near the end of its opinion, the court said that the defendants "turned
this simple claim for a $25,000.00 refund into a procedural morass and
marathon for the purpose ofintimidating and punishing plaintiff for daring
to sue them."
at 282.
E. Sex With Clients
Ethical problems can arise when an attorney establishes an intimate
sexual relationship with client. In Formal Opinion 92-364 (1992), the
ABA Ethics Committee observed that such a relationship involved
"danger of impairment to the lawyer's representation" and that the
"impairment is not avoided, the lawyer will have violated ethical
obligations to the client." California has adopted a rule that directly
addresses the impropriety ofsome attorney-client sexual relationships. See
Rule 3-120, California Rules of Professional Conduct. Although the
Louisiana rules do not expressly prohibit sexual relationships between
attorneys and clients, this does not mean that such relationships are a good
idea.
Sanders v. Gore
676 So. 2d 866 (La. Ct. App. 1996),
writ denied, 682 So. 2d 762 (La. 1996)
Sanders contacted attorney Gore about a collection matter. Although
both Sanders and Gore were married to others at the time, they began an
intimate sexual relationship that continued for over three years. Gore
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eventually convinced Sanders that he wanted to divorce his wife and marry
her. He also convinced her to leave her husband, and represented her in
obtaining a divorce. After Sanders' divorce, Gore formally asked Sanders
to marry him. She agreed. But later Gore broke off the relationship, telling
Sanders he was "too weak" to leave his wife.
Sanders sued for damages. Her petition explicitly detailed various
events that had occurred in their relationship, recounted numerous
in
"indiscretions," and made disparaging remarks about Gore's marriage,
the
affair.
which had survived
The court rejected Sanders' claim of damages based on breach of a
promise to marry, on the ground that contracts in derogation of marriage are
against public policy.
But Sanders also alleged an abuse of the attorney/client relationship.
Although the court rejected the claim, its language indicates that conduct of
the sort in question might give rise to both ethical violations and
recoverable damages:
Although this court finds Mr. Gore's actions ethically reprehensible,
Louisiana law does not prohibit sexual relationships between attorneys
and their clients. Also, although Ms. Sanders alleges a conflict of
interest in his handling of her divorce, she does not allege that Mr.
Gore failed to adequately represent her. Nor is it alleged that Ms.
a
Sanders was unaware of this conflict of interest. In fact, Ms. Sanders
specifically alleges in her petition that Mr. Gore told her the reason he
wanted her to file for divorce was so that he could marry her.
Furthermore, Ms. Sanders does not allege that Mr. Gore's handling of
her legal affairs caused her any injury that was independent of her
claim for breach of the promise to marry.
676 So. 2d at 872-873.
The courts seem to have concluded that there was at least a conflict of
interest involved in the divorce representation. But this was not
disciplinary case; it was a case in which the client sought damages from the
attorney for breach of his obligations to her. If she had been able to show
injury "independent" of the breach of promise to marry claim, the outcome
might have been different.
There was another problem with attorney conduct in this case. The
trial court was displeased with the "scandalous" statements contained
Sanders' petition, particularly the "unnecessary comments about Mr. Gore's
family and his sexual relationship with his wife." Id. at 874. The court
ordered Sanders' attorney to pay sanctions in the amount of $1000 and to
write a letter of apology to Gore's wife. Sanders, but not her attorney,
sought to appeal the sanction. The Third Circuit rejected her claim on
appeal, on the ground that Sanders had no interest in the sanctions imposed
on her lawyer. But "assuming arguendo that the issue of sanctions was
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properly before this court on appeal, we find that the trial court was well
within its authority in levying sanctions based on the egregious language of
the petition filed by [Sanders' attorney], a petition which states no cause of
action." Id.at 875. The court...referenced Articles if863 and 864 ofthe Code
ofCivil
(b)Procedure.
F. Restrictions on the Right to Practice Law
Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states:if
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) A partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of
a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except
agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
An agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to
practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private
parties.
Lawyer employment agreements frequently contain financial
provisions relating to the departure of the lawyer. Can those provisions
violate the rule?
Warner v. Carimi Law Firm
678 So. 2d 561 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
Warner was employed on a contract basis by the Carimi firm. He
worked for the firm for five years until Carimi changed the door locks and
refused to allow Warner access to his office. Carimi locked Warner out
because Carimi believed that Warner was planning to leave the firm and
take files that belonged to the firm. Warner thereafter set up his own
practice, handling cases of clients he took with him from the Carimi firm.
Carimi refused to pay Warner wages and fees allegedly due under their
employment agreement. Indeed, Carimi demanded that Warner repay
monies Carimi had advanced to on or behalf offormer clients of the firm,
accordance with an employment agreement between Carimi and Warner.
Litigation ensued over these, and other claims.
The employment agreement contained a number ofprovisions dealing
with termination. Among other things, it provided that Warner "takes
the out-of-pocket money advanced to or on behalf ofthe
over any client
client by CLF [the Carimi firm] shall be reimbursed to CLF in full within
ten (10) days." It provided that Warner "shall personally take over any
guarantee of payment CLF has extended on behalf of client." It further
provided that Warner's failure to reimburse the firm within the 10 day
period would result in Warner owing the firm "liquidated damages for this
failure equal to 25% of the owed monies" plus interest. 678 So. 2d at 563.
Finally, the agreement provided that Warner failed to make the required
payments, and he were found, after suit was filed, "to owe any fee or outof-pocket money whatsoever," he would owe "in addition to those fees and
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monies held by the Court to be owed to CLF, an additional sum equal to
twenty (20%) percent of [the gross fees plus out-of-pocket money, plus
liquidated damages and interest owed] as an attorney's fee." Id.
Carimi claimed that Warner owed it all outstanding costs and advances
on any files he had taken, plus liquidated damages and attorneys' fees as
provided in the agreement.
Several of Warner's clients (who were former Carimi clients) sought
to intervene in the litigation, alleging that Carimi's financial demands on
Warner made it impossible for him to handle their cases. These clients
sought to annul the employment agreement on the basis that it
"impermissibly interferes with their attorney-client relationship and directly
inhibits their rights to free choice of legal counsel." Id. at 562. The trial
court refused to allow the intervention; it also entered partial summary
judgment in favor of Carimi in the amount of $211,702.01, plus liquidated
damages, interest, and attorneys' fees.
of
On appeal, Warner contended that the cost-reimbursement clause of
the employment agreement violated Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, and was therefore void as against public policy. The Fifth Circuit
disagreed.
a It distinguished the case from Minge v. Weeks, 629 So. 2d 545
(Ct. App. 1993), where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found
unenforceable an employment contract that required the attorney to give his
former employer 80% ofthe fees generated by cases the attorney took with
him when he left. The financial disincentives in that contract violated the
"language and spirit of Rule 5.6." 678 So. 2d at 564 (citing Minge v.
Weeks, 629 So. 2d at 547). The present case was different, said the Fifth
Circuit:
Unlike the arrangement in Minge v. Weeks, this agreement does not
penalize the attorney who actually performs the work on the case by
forcing him to pay most of his fee to the former attorney. Rather,
simply shifts the burden offinancing the case from the former attorney
to the client's new attorney, which is where the burden should be.
Id. at 565.
Although the court rejected Warner's principal argument about Rule
5.6, it did reverse the summary judgment order. It said that the amount
the attorney's fee to be awarded was an issue of fact. It also concluded that
there were genuine fact issues about which clients he "took over," as well as
the amounts due on their cases.
G. Prescription of Malpractice Claims

Louisiana has a short prescriptive/peremptive period for attorney
malpractice claims. See La. Rev. Stat. 9:5605. Questions sometimes arise
about when the period begins to run. In the following case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered a claim that the statute did not begin to run
against lawyer who continued to represent the client after committing the
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malpractice and who was working to rectify the results of the malpractice.
Reeder v. North
701 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1997)
On July 10, 1989, Reeder, an investor in a fraudulent check kiting and
Ponzi scheme, brought suit in federal court against the organizers of the
scheme, claiming various violations of the securities laws. The federal case
was dismissed with prejudice in 1990. Then, in May of 1990, Reeder
brought an action in state court, asserting claims based on state securities
laws. But this action was dismissed on April 26, 1991 on the basis of res
judicata. Reeder appealed within the state court system, but eventually, on
September 3, 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's

dismissal with prejudice, holding that, under the doctrine ofres judicata, the
federal district court's final judgment barred all subsequent claims, state and
federal. Reeder's application for writ of certiorari was denied by the United

States Supreme Court on February 28, 1994. Thereafter, Reeder brought a
malpractice action against his former attorney, alleging that the attorney had
failed to assert all viable state causes of action in the original federal
lawsuit.

The defendants claimed that the malpractice action was time-barred.
The malpractice action was brought on September 15, 1994. Defendants
claimed this was more than three years after "the alleged act, omission or
neglect occurred." The trial court agreed, and granted the exception. On
appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Reeder argued that the "continuing
representation rule" applied, and that the cause of action for malpractice did
not accrue until the United States Supreme Court denied the application for
writ of certiorari in February 1994.
The Fifth Circuit reversed. It reasoned:
In determining when the claim against an attorney comes into
existence, and hence when prescription or peremption begins to run,
we must determine when the facts ripened into a viable cause of action
sufficient to support a lawsuit....
Throughout our jurisprudence, legal malpractice claims did not ripen
until the attorney-client relationship was terminated. If a malpractice
suit was filed against an attorney while he continued to represent the
client on the same subject matter originally undertaken, the suit was
premature....
...
While there exists an ongoing, continuous and dependent
relationship between the client and the attorney and the attorney is
seeking to rectify the alleged act of malpractice, the malpractice action
is premature....
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While the attorney-client relationship is in existence and the attorney
is actively attempting to remedy the alleged malpractice until the
judgment giving rise to the malpractice claim becomes definitive, a
legal malpractice claim does not ripen into a cause of action.
683 So. 2d at 915-916.
Accordingly, the court ruled that the cause of action had not
prescribed, because the malpractice action was filed within one year of the
date the "judgment became definitive," and had not been "preempted since
it is within three years of that date." Id. at 917.
The Louisiana Supreme court reversed. It considered the language of
R.S. 9:5605, and concluded that the legislature's intent was clear. In this
case, the "act, omission, or neglect" that was the basis of the malpractice
complaint was the attorney's failure to include the state law claims the
federal complaint, which was filed on July 10, 1989. The court said:
[T]he court of appeal was wrong in holding that the peremptive period
did not begin to run until the "facts ripened into a viable cause of
action sufficient to support a lawsuit," i.e., the date the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Because the negligent act occurred before
September 7, 1990, Reeder had until September 7, 1993 to file the
malpractice action, "without regard to the date of the discovery of the
alleged act, omission, or neglect."
701 So. 2d at 1296.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the terms of the malpractice
statute "may seem unfair" in "that a person's claim may be extinguished
before he realizes the full extent of his damages." However, it also said that
"the enactment of such a statute of limitations is exclusively a legislative
prerogative." Id. at 1296.
The Supreme Court also found error in the lower court's decision that
the peremptive period of the statute was, in effect, suspended during the
time when the attorney continued to represent Reeder in the state court
proceedings. The court said that, "[a]s a suspension principle based on
contra non valentem, the 'continuous representation rule' cannot apply to
peremptive periods." "Peremption" observed the court, "differs from
prescription." Id. at 1298. The court did, however, remand the case for
consideration of a claim that R.S. 9:5605 was unconstitutional.
H. Representing Yourself in Malpractice Litigation
Lawyers are sometimes tempted to represent themselves when they are
sued for malpractice. One of the issues that comes up is the applicability of
Rule 3.7 of the Rules on Professional Conduct, dealing with the "lawyer as
witness." The Rule provides, in part:
is(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
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A

on on
in
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
or
a
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value oflegal services
Id. in the case;
a
rendered
(b) (3)
Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
in
hardship on the client.
A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded
to
a
so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
from doing
The applicability of Rule 3.7 in the lawyer malpractice context was
directly considered in the following case.
Farrington v. Law Firm of Sessions, Fishman
687 So. 2d 997 (La., 1997)
Deborah Farrington and Roger Cope were equal shareholders in
business that they had purchased. After the purchase, members of the
Sessions law firm were asked to draft some documents and to assist with
corporate matters relating to the business. dispute arose between the two
shareholders, and, at the request of Cope, the Sessions firm filed suit on
behalf of the corporation against Farrington. After settlement of that
litigation, Farrington brought a malpractice action, claiming that members
of the Sessions firm had failed to provide her with adequate advice
connection with the structure of the business and that they had been
involved in a conflict of interest when they had sued her on behalf of the
corporation. The defendants contended that they had never represented
Farrington in an individual capacity.
The defendants were represented by Ezkovich, a member of the
Sessions law firm and a defendant in the malpractice lawsuit. When the
defendants attempted to take Farrington's deposition, she filed a motion
stay the taking ofthe deposition until an attorney who was not a member of
the Sessions firm was appointed to represent the defendants. She contended
that the defendants had conflict of interest in representing themselves,
account of their former attorney-client relationship with her, and that
protective order was needed to avoid the embarrassment and oppression that
she would suffer the attorneys were allowed "to proceed as advocates
their own behalf." Id. at 998.
The main issue before the Supreme Court was "whether lawyer who
is sued by an alleged former client on grounds of malpractice has the right
at 999.
to conduct adversarial proceedings on his or her own behalf."
The court answered this question in the affirmative.
Initially, the court noted that the Louisiana Constitution guarantees
every person the right of access to the courts, 2 and that Louisiana courts
2

La. Const. Art. 1, §22.
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have recognized "the right of litigants in civil proceedings to represent
themselves in court." 687 So. 2d at 999. The court acknowledged that
Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct "prohibits a lawyer from
acting as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be called as a
necessary witness except under certain circumstances," but said that "Rule
3.7 does not address the situation where the lawyer is representing himself."
Id.
The Court was persuaded, at least in part by what it called the
"Comments to Rule 3.7." It cited an ABA-prepared annotation to Rule 3.7
(which is not actually one of the official comments to the model rule) for
the proposition that the "rationales of the advocate-witness rule do not apply
to the pro se lawyer-litigant." See Center for Professional Responsibility,
American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct
362 (3d ed. 1996). The court quoted the following from a Connecticut
in
case:
One reason is that it is unfair to the client that his case be presented
through a witness whom the trier of fact would necessarily view as
interested because of the witness' zeal of advocacy and likely interest
in the result of the case. A second reason is one of public policy:
permitting an attorney who is trying a case also to be a witness
establishing its facts will visit on the legal profession public distrust
and suspicion arising from the attorney's dual role. That is the reason
which Professor Wigmore believed to be the most potent reason for the
prohibition of the attorney as a witness on behalf of his client. The
public will be apt to think that the lawyer, whether he is an active
partner in the conduct of the trial and also a material witness, or an5inactive partner and a material witness, will be inclined to warp the
truth in the interest of his client. The third reason for the rule is to
avoid the appearance of wrongdoing. We do not believe that any of
these reasons applies where the attorney seeks only to represent
himself in his own case.
Id. at 1000 (quoting from Presnick v. Esposito, 513 A.2d 165, 167
(Conn. Ct. App. 1986).
The court also cited a Massachusetts case for the following line of
reasoning:
Any perception by the public or determination by a jury that a lawyer
litigant has twisted the truth surely would be due to his role as litigant
and not, we would hope, to his occupation as a lawyer. As a party
litigant, moreover, a lawyer could represent himself is he so chose.
Implicit in the right of self-representation is the right of representation
by retained counsel of one's choosing. A party litigant does not lose
this right merely because he is a lawyer and therefore subject to DR
102 [the Massachusetts rule that corresponds with Rule 3.7].
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(1) (E.

a
v. Borman, 393 N.E.2d 847, 856
Id.at 1000
if (quoting from Borman
to
(Mass.
1979).
a
(b) A
(2)
The Supreme Court also concluded that the conflicts of interest rules
in in the defense of
did not preclude a lawyer from representing
himself
a
malpractice claim brought by an alleged former client. Among other things,
the Court said that by filing her malpractice action against her alleged
former lawyers Farrington "has waived any right to suggest that the lawyers
will violate Rules 1.7 and 1.9 [conflict of interest rules] by taking an
adverse position to her in the suit she had brought against them." Id. at
1001.
However, the Court said that if "during the course of these
proceedings, the combined role of lawyer and party is abused, the trial
judge, in his discretion, may impose whatever sanctions are necessary to
insure the orderly conduct of the proceedings including requiring
defendants to procure independent counsel to conduct the adversarial
proceedings." Id. at 1001.
I. Conflicts of Interest
Rule 1.7 is the basic rule on conflicts of interest. It provides, among
other things, that:
(a)
lawyer shall not represent client the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
Each client consents after consultation.
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
The client consents after consultation.
An interesting 1.7 issue came up in recent federal district court case.
In re Suard Barge Services Inc.

D. La. 1997), (not officially reported)
1997 WL 703000
Windham sustained a "catastrophic" head injury while aboard a barge
that was owned by Suard Barge Services. He wife, as conservator, sued
Suard and Hopson Marine Transportation in state court. The defendants,
turn, brought a limitation ofliability suit against Windham in federal court.
Windham was represented in both courts by attorney Best. In the
federal lawsuit, Best subpoenaed Gray Insurance, the insurer of the prior
owner ofthe barge, to obtain records about similar accident that had taken
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place on the barge when it was owned by Grand Isle Shipyards. Gray
refused to provide copies of records to Best. Best filed a motion to compel
against Gray.
Grand Isle and Gray moved to disqualify Best from representing
Windham on the ground that Best had previously represented Gray in an
unrelated matter at the same time that Best had been representing Windham.
In an evidentiary hearing, Best testified that his firm had received only one
assignment from Gray in the prior 6 years. However, Best conceded that
if
I time he was
for Gray in that matter at the
his law firm had been counsel
hired by Windham. Best withdrew from that matter after the conflict of
a
interest issue arose.
Best argued against disqualification on the ground, among others, that
Windham had not asserted any claim for damages against Gray. The
question, though, was whether the subpoena and the motion to compel were
sufficient to make Best "directly adverse" to Gray. Here is what the
magistrate thought:
On this record, I do not find that the subpoena itself was "directly
adverse" to Gray's interests. However, find that Windham's motion
to compel and for sanctions, filed while Best represented both
Windham and Gray, was directly adverse to Gray. The comments to
the Model Rules state that "a lawyer may not act as advocate against
client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even the other
matter is wholly unrelated." ... Best is clearly acting as an advocate

against Gray, who was a current client in another matter, and Gray
will obviously be prejudiced if sanctions are assessed against it.
1997 WL at 3.
The magistrate said that Best violated Rule 1.7. What about
disqualification? Here, the magistrate did not think that Best should be
altogether disqualified from representing Windham. Disqualification was
never "automatic." Best could continue to represent Windham, but could
not do so in connection with matters concerning Gray (the subpoena and the
motion for sanctions).
POOF
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